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INTRODUCTION 
In general, when federal agencies find themselves in court, they are rep-
resented by attorneys from the Department of Justice (DOJ). Congress has 
designated DOJ as the litigator for the United States and its administrative 
agencies. Agencies may not employ outside counsel for litigation; they 
must refer all matters to DOJ.1 DOJ then decides whether the case should 
• Visiting Professor of Law, New York University School of Law; Professor of Law, 
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University. 
•• Goodrich Professor of Law and Lecturer of Government, College of William and 
Mary. 
l. SeeS U.S.C. § 3106 (I994) ("Except as otherwise authorized by law, the head of 
an Executive department or military department may not employ an attorney or counsel for 
the conduct of litigation in which the United States, an agency, or employee thereof is a 
party, or is interested, or for the securing of evidence therefor, but shall refer the matter to 
the Department of Justice."); see also 28 U.S.C. § 516 (1994) ("Except as otherwise 
authorized by law, the conduct of litigation in which the United States, an agency, or officer 
1345 
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be litigated and, if it decides to proceed, DOJ handles the lawyering. 
Legal academics and government lawyers alike take for granted that 
DOJ ought to speak the government's voice in court. Thus, while the lit-
erature is replete with discussions of the appropriate scope of agency inde-
pendence from or control by other governmental actors, DOJ's monopoly 
over government litigation is unquestioned. DOJ's status is justified on the 
grounds that a single, highly talented ·"law firm" will ensure quality repre-
sentation, consiste·ncy, efficiency, and responsiveness to presidential pref-
erences. This argument asserts the absolute necessity-for reasons of gov-
ernmental integrity, effective litigation, and fairness-that the government 
speak with one voice in the courts, a consistency that can only be achieved 
by centralizing litigation authority. In addition, because the Attorney Gen-
eral sees the big picture-and sees it with the same eyes as the President-
centralization ensures that the lawyering is consistent with the broader 
policy concerns of the Administration. This perspective ensures that the 
parochial concerns of single-mission agencies do not take precedence over 
larger policy commitments, and that conflicts between agencies are appro-
priately resolved. Furthermore, from DOJ's standpoint, the litigator's ex-
pertise is litigation; DOJ lawyers have what agency lawyers may lack: 
courtroom skills and familiarity with recurrent non-agency-specific legal 
questions. 
These arguments should not be accepted uncritically. Our task in this 
article, however, is not to evaluate the claimed benefits of centralized liti-
gating authority, but to consider a possible cost: the effect of such an ar-
rangement on the agency's substantive program. Allowing DOJ to control 
agency litigation might have such an effect in three ways. First, and most 
obviously, it might reduce the scope and effectiveness of agency enforce-
ment. Second, it might lead to avoidable courtroom losses-for example, 
setting aside a regulation-through which the judiciary creates obstacles to 
the agency's program. Third, it might encourage DOJ to adopt an aggres-
sive stance toward its "client" agencies, directly influencing or interfering 
with the agencies' substantive decisions. 
Despite its general commitment to DOJ as the agencies' litigator, Con-
gress occasionally has removed control of litigation from DOJ because of 
the foregoing concerns, in particular the first. In the extreme example, the 
litigator's role is taken out of the hands of government attorneys altogether. 
thereof is a party, or is interested, and securing evidence therefor, is reserved to officers of 
the Department of Justice, under the direction of the Attorney General."); 28 U.S.C. § 519 
(1994) ("Except as otherwise authorized by law, the Attorney General shall supervise all 
litigation to which the United States, an agency, or officer thereof is a party, and shall direct 
all United States attorneys, assistant United States attorneys, and special attorneys appointed 
under section 543 of this title in the discharge of their respective duties."). 
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For example, the False Claims Act/ first adopted during the Civil War, im-
poses civil liability on any person who defrauds the U.S. government. The 
Act provides that any private person, as a self-designated qui tam relator, 
may bring an action "in the name of the Government" "for the person and 
for the United States Government."3 The False Claims Act clearly pro-
ceeds on the assumption that the government, whether for reasons of cro-
nyism or lack of resources, will fail to pursue some fraud cases that in fact 
ought to be pursued.4 Similarly, Congress has concluded that the many in-
stances in which private citizens can bring enforcement actions as "private 
attorneys general" are settings in which relying on DOJ alone to bring en-
forcement actions will lead to underenforcement. 5 
Shy of these examples, Congress has also, in many instances, allowed 
individual agencies to litigate some or all of their cases without relying on 
DOJ. One searches in vain for an organizing principle to explain when and 
to what extent agencies are granted independent litigating authority.6 Ex-
planations for this haphazard arrangement will be found more in case-by-
case political pressures and circumstances than in a unified vision of inde-
2. 31 u.s.c. §§ 3729-3733 (1994). 
3. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(l) (1994); see id. § 3730(c)(2)(A) (stating that government 
can-though it rarely does-move to dismiss even meritorious suits over relator's objec-
tion); id. § 3730(c)(3) (stating that government may join suit or decline intervention and al-
low relator to continue litigating claims); see also United States ex rei. Sequoia Orange Co. 
v. Baird-Neece Packing Corp., 151 F.3d 1139, 1144 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that government 
"has the right to track the litigation and to intervene at a later date upon a showing of good 
cause" and holding that government has authority to dismiss qui tam suits "if the relator is 
afforded notice and a hearing"). 
4. The private plaintiff is truly litigating on behalf of the government-she recovers a 
bounty, but the fee is only triggered by the harm the government suffers. See Vermont 
Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rei. Stevens, 120 S. Ct. 1858, 1862-65 
(2000) (holding that relator has Article III standing). The Court rejected the notion that a 
private plaintiffs reliance on the bounty she may recover is the source of the constitution-
ally required concrete stake in the controversy. Instead, the Court reasoned that the relator 
is the assignee of government's claim. !d. 
5. For a general discussion of citizen suits, see Jeremy A. Rabkin, The Secret Life of 
the Private Attorney General, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 179 (Winter 1998). The erst-
while Independent Counsel statute provides one further example of Congress removing liti-
gating authority from DOJ. While the Independent Counsel was a governmental employee, 
in practice she functioned as a private attorney, retained precisely because government law-
yers cannot be relied on to pursue certain claims with sufficient vigor. (Recent events, of 
course, have prompted a reconsideration of that theory. For many, the Independent Counsel 
now stands as a glaring reminder of what goes wrong when enforcement is removed from 
DOJ.) 
6. See generally Neal Devins, Unitariness and Independence: Solicitor General Con-
trol Over Independent Agency Litigation, 82 CAL. L. REv. 255, 263-73 (1994) (describing 
variety of litigating arrangements). 
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pendent litigating authority. Furthennore, part of the explanation lies in 
Congress' perception of how litigating arrangements will maximize its own 
authority and influence.7 Nonetheless, one consideration is the same con-
cern reflected in Congress' occasional decision to place litigating authority 
outside the federal government altogether: namely, that DOJ interferes with 
rather than advances substantive agency programs, primarily, though not 
exclusively, by diluting effective enforcement.8 
Thus, the instances in which Congress has reallocated litigation authority 
generally involve perceived failures, usually of enforcement, by a specific 
agency that are brought to Congress' attention, usually by dismayed inter-
est groups. For example, the 1975 Federal Trade Commission Improve-
ments Act,9 which granted independent litigating authority to the Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC}, was a direct response to the perceived failure of 
DOJ to adequately represent the FTC. 10 At the time of the Act's passage, 
the question of enforcement, and therefore, the locus of litigation authority 
itself, had become an acute problem. 11 
Consider also the situation of the Federal Election Commission (FEC). 
The political delicacy of the FEC's mission and the need for avoiding the 
appearance of favoritism led Congress to give the FEC independent liti-
gating authority in the lower courts. 12 The same underlying concerns are 
7. See Neal Devins & Michael Herz, The Bailie That Never Was: Congress, The 
White House, and Agency Litigation Authority, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 205, 220-22 
(Winter 1998) (arguing that Judiciary Committees have been, relatively speaking, more en-
thusiastic about DOJ control of litigation because such arrangement enhances their own in-
fluence). 
8. In Part II, infra, we describe some congressional battles arising out of these con-
cems. 
9. See Pub. L. No. 93-637, § 204,88 Stat. 2183,2199 (1975) (codified as amended at 
15 U.S.C. § 56 (1994)) (granting FTC authority to represent itself before the Supreme 
Court); see also Act of Nov. 16, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-153, § 408, 87 Stat. 576, 591-92 
( 1973) (authorizing FTC to represent itself on lower federal courts). 
10. See Devins, supra note 6, at 269-77. 
11 . See id. at 270 (noting that "on matters referred by the FTC to the Department of 
Justice, significant delays in filing, unfavorable settlements, and the refusal to file cases be-
came common practice;" furthermore, DOJ successfully fought off FTC attempts to enforce 
its own subpoenas). 
12. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 437c(f)(4), 437d(a)(6), 437d(b) (1994); 26 U.S.C. §§ 90lO(a), 
9040(a) (1994); George F. Fraley, Ill, Comment, Is the Fox Watching the Henhouse?: The 
Administration's Control of FEC Litigation Through the Solicitor General, 9 ADMIN. L.J. 
AM. U. 1215, 1272 (1996) (concluding that FEC should have complete litigating authority 
so as to avoid conflict of interest that undermines the integrity of election process); see also 
FEC v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 513 U.S. 88, 97-99 (1994) (holding that FEC's general 
authority to represent itself does not extend to litigation in Supreme Court, in which FEC 
must be represented by Solicitor General); Alane Tempchin, Note, Fa// from Grace: Federal 
Election Commission v. NRA Political Victory Fund and the Demise of the FEC's lnde-
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reflected in the FEC's unusual even number of commissioners. The stan-
dard independent agency has a bipartisanship requirement, with an odd 
number of commissioners, allowing for some measure of political advan-
tage by one party over the other. In contrast, the FEC must be bipartisan 
and has an even number of commissioners. The same sort of concerns that 
militate in favor of this agency's independence, and for its unique apolitical 
structure, also support independent litigating authority. Influence or con-
trol by the DOJ or the White House would compromise the agency's ability 
to do its job. 
In this Article, we explore, in preliminary fashion, whether Congress' 
reallocation of litigating authority ought to be broader than is generally be-
lieved. That is, even though most agencies do not have the sort of mandate 
that characterizes the FEC, could other agencies be hampered in their sub-
stantive program by having to rely on the DOJ for representation in court? 
Part I describes some of the instances in which Congress has considered 
shifting control of litigation from the DOJ to an agency13 because of serious 
doubts as to the DOJ's effectiveness in representing the agency. In Part II, 
we consider whether these concerns are, as a general matter, justified. We 
conclude that the DOJ's control of litigation is not inconsequential, but its 
effects are hard to quantify and are generally influenced by other factors. 
We should stress at the outset that our inquiry is quite limited. A full re-
view of the pluses and minuses of DOJ control of agency litigation is be-
yond the scope of this Article.14 Here we examine only one piece of the 
puzzle: What effect, if any, does DOJ control have on the way agencies 
carry out their substantive programs and the effectiveness with which they 
do so? 
I. SOME HISTORY 
Over the three decades of the EPA's existence, the question of whether 
the effective implementation of EPA's substantive programs has been 
hampered by DOJ has been recurrent. In this section, we consider three in-
stances--one from the 70's, one from the 80's, and one from the 90's-
where Congress' concerns became so acute that it gave serious 
consideration to limiting DOJ control of EPA litigation. 
pendent Litigating Authority, 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 385, 413 (1996) (arguing that Victory 
Fund makes FEC dependent on Executive branch and undermines public confidence in 
American electoral system). 
13. Our focus is on the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 
14. We are, however, engaged on such a project with the working title of The Uneasy 
Case for Justice Department Control of Agency Litigation. 
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A. Clean Air Act-1970s 
1. The 1970 Act 
In July 1970, President Nixon invoked his reorganization authority to 
establish an Environmental Protection Agency. The EPA was formed by 
merging programs and authority from fifteen different agencies, including 
the Departments of Agriculture, Interior, and. Health, Education, and Wel-
fare. Since neither the Senate nor the House took action to oppose the plan, 
the reorganization became effective in September 1970. 
Under the White House reorganization, the Attorney General remained 
in charge of federal environmental litigation. However, environmental 
groups, their congressional allies, and the EPA itself sought to limit this hi-
erarchical structure. The earliest and most direct attack on Attorney Gen-
eral control came almost immediately when Congress enacted the first of 
the major federal pollution control laws, the Clean Air Act of 1970 (CAA). 
The Senate bill provided authority for the EPA to represent itself in court. 15 
In the view of the Committee on Public Works, "full time legal assistance" 
and "the development of competence and expertise" within the agency 
were necessary for the Act to be implemented effectively. 16 The Nixon 
Administration opposed this call for specialist environmental litigators, de-
fending "the sound administrative practice of relying on the Justice De-
partment's established legal expertise and resources."17 In the end, a com-
promise was reached. The EPA could represent itself, but only if the 
"Administrator determines that the Attorney General will not act, or will 
not act soon enough."18 The same arrangement was included in the 1972 
Clean Water Act19 and the 1974 Safe Drinking Water Act.20 
15. SeeS. REP. No. 91-1196, at 39 (1970). 
16. !d. 
17. Letter from Elliot Richardson, Secretary of HEW to Senate Comm. on Public 
Works, reprinted in H.R. CONF. REP. 91-1783, at 218 (1970). 
18. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 91-1783, at 56 (1970). The specific provision provided: 
The Administrator shall request the Attorney General to appear and represent him in 
any civil action instituted under this Act to which the Administrator is a party. Un-
less the Attorney General notifies the Administrator that he will appear in such action 
within a reasonable time, attorneys appointed by the Administrator shall appear and 
represent him. 
Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 305, 84 Stat. 1676, 1707. The pro-
vision has since been amended. 
19. See Federal Water Pqllution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-
500, § 2, 86 Stat. 816, 889 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1366 (1994)). 
The Administrator shall request the Attorney General to appear and represent the 
United States in any civil or criminal action instituted under this Act to which the 
Administrator is a party. Unless the Attorney General notifies the Administrator 
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In practice, this arrangement meant that DOJ represented the agency in 
court in all cases. However, the possibility of EPA going to court without 
DOJ was a significant factor in discussions between the EPA and DOJ and 
affected DOJ's willingness to pursue litigation. The Attorney General 
could not turn his back on the agency without risking his control of envi-
ronmental litigation. The EPA, therefore, had more leverage and greater 
autonomy than most executive agencies. Of equal significance, Congress 
signaled its expectation that the federal government would vigorously en-
force environmental laws. Specifically, through its power to oversee the 
EPA, Congress' environmental subcommittees could make sure that the 
executive branch satisfied legislative priorities by pressuring the EPA to 
strike out against DOJ. Moreover, Senator Muskie and other pro-
environmental Senators made use of the Senate's confirmation power to 
press EPA appointees about their willingness to resist White House pres-
sures and make independent decisions? 1 In short, the CAA compromise 
was rooted in the belief that, like independent regulatory agencies who 
could opt out of Attorney General representation, the EPA would be will-
ing to disagree with DOJ ?2 
2. The 1977 Amendments 
DOJ representation of the EPA came under sharp congressional attack in 
the post-Watergate period. From 1975 to 1977, when the CAA was under-
going a major legislative overhaul, environmentalists and their allies in 
Congress sought to transfer litigation authority from DOJ to the EPA and 
/d. 
/d. 
within a reasonable time, that he will appear in a civil action, attorneys who are offi-
cers or employees of the Environmental Protection Agency shall appear and represent 
the United States in such action. 
20. See Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974,42 U.S.C. § 300j-9(f) (1994). 
The Administrator shall request the Attorney General to appear and represent him in 
any civil action instituted under this subchapter to which the Administrator is a party. 
Unless, within a reasonable time, the Attorney General notifies the Administrator that 
he will appear in such action, attorneys appointed by the Administrator shall appear 
and represent him. 
21. See Richard J. Lazarus, The Tragedy of Distrust in the Implementation of Federal 
Environmental Law, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 311 , 319-20 {Autumn 1991). 
22. At that time, the EPA believed that it should speak its own voice in court. See gen-
erally United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669 
(1973) (noting that the EPA had sought to submit its own brief to the Supreme Court). 
While Solicitor General Robert Bork rejected this request, the EPA letter making the request 
(which set forth the agency's view of the case) was submitted to the Court by way of a sup-
plemental brief filed by Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures. 
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came close to doing so. This effort reflected a political setting in which the 
White House and DOJ were quite weak. 
Watergate prompted Congress to limit the concentration of power within 
the executive branch, including DOJ's control of government litigation. At 
roughly the same time, Congress was limiting White House authority in 
fiscal policymaking through the 1974 Budget Act, considering making DOJ 
an independent agency, and debating legislation to further insulate inde-
pendent agencies from executive influence?3 Although efforts to remove 
DOJ from the executive branch were rejected, DOJ was hit particularly 
hard by Watergate. Thus, Congress created an Office of Senate Legal 
Counsel to defend its interests in court, Attorney General control over ex-
ecutive branch misconduct was constrained by the Ethics in Government 
Act, and independent litigating authority was granted to the FEC, Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), FTC, and the Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission (CFTC).24 
The White House was limited in its ability to fend off the legislative as-
sault on DOJ control. With Watergate making the Attorney General appear 
too much like a political crony of the president and too little like an even-
handed enforcer of the nation's laws, the Ford Administration could hardly 
demand that government litigation be centralized in DOJ. For this reason, 
the Ford Administration did little to resist legislative proposals to limit DOJ 
authority.25 The Carter Administration, which came to office on an anti-
23. See LOUIS FISHER, THE POLITICS OF SHARED POWER: CONGRESS AND THE 
EXECUTIVE 227-36 (4th ed. 1998) (discussing the Budget Act of 1974); Removing Politics 
from the Administration of Justice: Hearings on S. 2803 and S. 2978 Before the Subcomm. 
on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 3 (1974) (re-
viewing efforts to remove DOJ from the Executive branch); see also S. Doc. No. 95-91, at 
62-67 (1977) (discussing proposed legislation to authorize independent agency litigation 
before the Supreme Court). 
24. For example, in support of granting such authority to the CFTC, it was argued that 
doing so would avoid "partisan political pressures" that were introduced when DOJ had a 
"veto" over litigation. See Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act: Hearings Before 
Senate Comm. on Agric. and Forestry, 93d Cong. 209 (1974) (statement of Rep. Smith); see 
also id. at 229 (statement of Richard Feltner, Asst. Secretary for Marketing & Consumer 
Services, Dep't of Agriculture) (stating that granting the commission authority to seek in-
junctions will "facilitate enforcement of the act"). In a lengthy description of the genesis 
and legislative battles surrounding the creation of the CFTC, Professor Romano describes 
the grant of independent litigating authority as one of a variety of measures to insulate the 
new agency from executive branch control. See Roberta Romano, The Political Dynamics 
of Derivative Securities Regulation, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 279, 352 (1997). 
25. See James T. Hamilton & Christopher H. Schroeder, Strategic Regulators and the 
Choice of Rulemaking Procedures: The Selection of Formal vs. Informal Rules in Regulat-
ing Hazardous Waste, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. Ill, 123-24 (Spring 1994) (discussing 
actions of the Ford administration with regard to legislative proposals). 
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Watergate platform, likewise largely accepted statutory exceptions to DOJ 
control.26 
At the same time, Congress and environmental interests were unhappy 
with the pace of CAA enforcement. During its first five years, the EPA 
had established itself as a quasi-independent enterprise, distancing itself 
from the White House and DOJ on, among other things, enforcement.27 
With Congress rapidly expanding the EPA's mission through the enactment 
of several significant pieces of environmental legislation,28 the EPA was 
determined to make itself more powerful and more independent. In par-
ticular, dissatisfaction with DOJ by the EPA and environmental interests 
resulted in congressional efforts to restructure federal environmental litiga-
tion. Pointing to formal letters of complaint from the EPA to DOJ, in 1976 
the House Energy and Commerce Committee proposed granting the Ad-
ministrator "exclusive authority to commence or defend . . . in his own 
name and by any attorney of the EPA" any civil action in the lower federal 
courts brought under the Act.29 For the Committee, DOJ had proven itself 
a poor advocate for the EPA. By either failing to consult with the EPA or 
dragging its feet in filing cases, DOJ had both slowed down enforcement 
and created bad case law.3° Furthermore, because it represented both fed-
eral polluters and the EPA, DOJ was often beset by conflict of interests.31 
In contrast to its low opinion of DOJ, the Committee applauded the EPA 
attorneys for their "special expertise and background in fields such as me-
teorology, topography, health effects, research photochemistry, and de-
tailed familiarity with environmental legislation," a background necessary 
to successfully litigate "often complex, highly technical" environmental 
cases.32 In short, the backers of this provision were concerned about two 
recurrent issues: ( 1) they felt that poor DOJ representation was resulting in 
26. See infra note 36 and accompanying text (discussing President Carter's Reorgani-
zation Project and noting that when running for president Jimmy Carter had said DOJ 
should be an independent agency). 
27. See MARC K. LANDY ET AL., THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY: ASKING 
THE WRONG QUESTIONS 33-39 ( 1990). 
28. See Joel A. Mintz, Agencies, Congress and Regulatory Enforcement: A Review of 
EPA's Hazardous Waste Enforcement Effort, /970-1987, 18 ENVTL. L. 683, 694-95 (1988) 
(describing growth of EPA's statutory authority and its enforcement program). 
29. H.R. 10,498, 94th Cong. § 311 (1976); 122 CONG. REC. 30,774,30,798-99 (1976). 
30. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1175, at 273-74 (1976) (describing the problems with DOJ 
litigation). 
31 . See id. at 274 (noting that DOJ finds itself in a conflict of interest when it tries to 
represent both the Administrator and other Federal agencies). 
32. /d. at 273. 
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court losses, and (2) they felt that a lack of sufficient enforcement enthusi-
asm was resulting in important, winnable cases simply not being brought.33 
Saddled by Watergate, the Ford Administration did little to resist this 
proposed transfer of litigation authority; instead, resistance came from the 
Senate Judiciary Committee, which did not want to reduce its oversight re-
sponsibilities by narrowing DOJ control of litigation?4 The Senate pre-
vailed, convincing the House to drop this provision. Congress, however, 
did not vote on clean air legislation in 1976. 
When the Clean Air amendments resurfaced in 1977, the Carter White 
House joined the Senate in opposing the restructuring of EPA litigation 
authority.35 Unlike Ford's Administration, the Carter White House sought 
to use Watergate to its advantage. Through its reorganization project and 
executive order on government litigation, the Carter administration empha-
sized DOJ independence from White House controls/6 recasting DOJ as a 
committed advocate for its agency clients. DOJ assisted in this effort by 
entering into "memorandums of understanding" (MOUs) with government 
agencies to ensure DOJ responsiveness to agency needs. The July 13, 1977 
EP A/DOJ MOU gives the Attorney General "control over all cases" to 
which the EPA is a party, but provides for some involvement by agency 
attorneys in the actual litigation; it gives the department 150 days to act on 
a referral from the agency, after which time the agency's power to repre-
sent itself is triggered.37 
The Carter Administration's embrace of MOUs, along with the Senate 
Judiciary Committee support, proved critical to the Carter DOJ's successful 
resistance to proposed limits on its litigation authority. In the end, the 1977 
Clean Air Act Amendments essentially wrote the MOU into the Act. Con-
gress left intact the 1970 provision, under which the Administrator could in 
theory go to court represented by agency attorneys and added a provision 
33. See generally Craig N. Oren, Clearing the Air: The McCubbins-No/1-Weingast Hy-
pothesis and the Clean Air Act, 9 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 45, 88-90 (1989) (describing congres-
sional concerns over insufficiently vigorous enforcement). 
34. See Devins & Herz, supra note 7, at 220-22 (discussing reasons that Judiciary 
Committee has strong interest in DOJ litigation control); see also infra notes 47-48 and ac-
companying text. 
35. SeeS. REP. No. 95-127, at 53 (1977) (reprinting letter from Carter's Attorney Gen-
eral, Griffin B. Bell, opposing restructuring). 
36. See generally Griffin B. Bell, The Attorney General: The Federal Government's 
Chief Lawyer and Chief Litigator, or One Among Many?, 46 FORDHAM L. REv. 1049, 1058-
59 ( 1978) (insisting that DOJ should represent regulatory agencies while acknowledging the 
importance of autonomy). 
37. Memorandum of Understanding Between Department of Justice and Environmental 
Protection Agency, 42 Fed. Reg. 48,942 (Sept. 26, 1977). 
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stating that if DOJ did represent the agency it was to do so in accordance 
with the MOU.38 
B. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act-1980s 
The next major congressional threat to DOJ control of EPA litigation 
arose in the mid-1980s during consideration of the Hazardous and Solid 
Waste Amendments (HSWA) to the Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act (RCRA). Pointing to DOJ's failure to act on an EPA referral and file a 
lawsuit against a trailer park situated on top of an asbestos site, the House 
Energy and Commerce Committee proposed allowing the EPA to go to 
court on its own whenever DOJ did not file an action within 150 days of 
the referral.39 This was a more modest approach than the 1976 proposal to 
transfer clean air litigation authority altogether. The Committee portrayed 
its proposal as anything but revolutionary, claiming that "litigation exper-
tise is not the sole province of the Justice Department" and pointing to 
identical time limits in the EPNDOJ MOU.40 
The circumstances surrounding the RCRA proposal were far different 
than those that led to the 1977 MOU. In 1984, when the battle over RCRA 
took place, it was the EPA-not DOJ-that was under attack. As EPA of-
ficials Bruce Adler and Walter Mugdan put it: "[B]etween 1980 and 1983, 
Congress came to perceive EPA as an agency unwilling or unable to fulfill 
its mandate of environmental protection. Almost every section of the 
RCRA Amendments might be read as expressing a sense of frustra-
tion .... '>4 1 The principal sources of this frustration were Reagan EPA 
appointees, especially administrator Anne Burford and Assistant Adminis-
trator for Solid Waste and Emergency Response Rita Lavelle. Appointed 
to transform the quasi-independent EPA into an agent of the White House, 
Reagan's EPA appointees prompted a firestorm of criticism and much 
more. Congressional Republicans and Democrats alike accused them of 
"poor performance ... from a lack of expertise, inexperience, incompe-
tence and mismanagement ... .'>42 Indeed, legislation was introduced in 
the House in 1982 and in the Senate in 1983 to make the EPA an independ-
38. See 42 U .S.C. § 7605 (1994). 
39. See H .R . REP. No. 98-198, pt. I, at 49 (1983). 
40. /d. at 51. 
41. Walter E. Mugdan & Bruce R. Adler, The 1984 RCRA Amendments: Congress as a 
Regulatory Agency, I 0 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 215, 217 ( 1985). 
42. SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY 
AND COMMERCE, 98TH CONG., 2D SESS., INVESTIGATION OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION AGENCY: REPORT ON THE PRESIDENT'S CLAIM OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE OVER 
EPA DOCUMENTS, ABUSES IN THE SUPERFUND PROGRAM, AND OTHER MATTERS 295 (Comm. 
Print 1984) (hereinafter REPORT ON THE PRESIDENT'S CLAIM OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE). 
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ent regulatory commission and thereby free it from White House control. 
While this effort was principally symbolic, bad blood between the Con-
gress and the EPA helped force Burford, Lavelle, and twenty other Reagan 
appointees to leave the EPA in disgrace.43 
DOJ, however, faced no comparable pressures. For starters, DOJ offi-
cials in charge of EPA litigation were barely burned by the Congress-EPA 
fires. While DOJ may have been slow in pursing the trailer park case, it 
had previously pursed sixty-four of seventy-two RCRA referrals.44 DOJ 
authority was also bolstered by the Reagan White House. A strong believer 
in centralized authority, the Reagan administration vigorously and consis-
tently opposed congressional efforts to grant litigation authority outside 
DOJ. The 1984 EPA litigation dispute was no exception to this pattern, 
and DOJ spoke out against this proposal, testifying that "[ o ]nly unitary liti-
gation authority can ensure" that the government speak one voice in 
court.45 These sentiments, moreover, were echoed by the EPA. When 
William Ruckelshaus replaced Anne Burford, EPA lined up behind DOJ 
control. Indeed, Ruckelshaus (who had held the number two spot at Justice 
earlier in his career) testified before and wrote to Congress that EPA had 
"greatly benefited by centralized and coordinated litigation by the Depart-
ment of Justice.'"'6 
Ruckelshaus's defense of DOJ centralization, DOJ's willingness to pur-
sue most RCRA referrals, and "an astonishing two years of mismanage-
ment at EPA" figured prominently in House Judiciary Committee efforts to 
defeat the Energy and Commerce Committee proposal.47 Self-interest may 
also have motivated the Judiciary Committee, whose authority over the 
EPA is indirect, via its oversight authority over DOJ, and hinges on DOJ 
control of litigation. It .is therefore not surprising to find "[t]he merits of 
centralizing litigating authority" extolled by the Judiciary Committee, 
while Energy and Commerce, which has broader oversight authority over 
the EPA than over DOJ, supports some decentralization of litigation 
h . 48 aut onty. 
One other factor surely underlies the Energy and Commerce proposal: a 
desire to punish DOJ for compelling the EPA to claim executive privilege 
43. See Edward J. Markey, Congress to Administrative Agencies: Creator, Overseer, 
and Partner, 1990 DUKE L.J. 967, 969 (giving one lawmaker's (partisan) account of Con-
gress-EPA relations). 
44. See H.R. REP. No. 98-198, pt. 3, at 4 (1983). 
45. /d. (alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
46. /d. 
47. /d. at 6 (citation omitted). 
48. /d. at 4; see Devins & Herz, supra note 7, at 220-22. 
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and refuse to turn over documents to Committee investigators.49 This dis-
pute, which led to a contempt of Congress citation against EPA Adminis-
trator Burford and acrimonious litigation between DOJ and Congress, was 
rooted in DOJ' s belief that "the Attorney General's obligation to represent 
and advocate the 'client' agency's position must yield to a higher obliga-
tion to [serve the President's interests and] take care that the laws be exe-
cuted faithfully."50 Energy and Commerce strongly resented its oversight 
authority being limited by this DOJ appeal to the principle of the "unitary 
executive." It struck back with its RCRA proposal. In the end, however, 
the House Judiciary view prevailed and the RCRA amendments did not 
provide for EPA litigation authority. 
C. Criminal Prosecutions-1990s 
Early in 1992, Congressman John Dingell's Subcommittee on Oversight 
and Investigations of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce be-
gan an investigation into the prosecution of environmental crimes. The 
Subcommittee's concern, in the words of staffer Reid Stuntz, was "that 
management personnel in the Environment and Natural Resources Division 
of the Department of Justice were seriously undermining the environmental 
criminal enforcement program ... [having] second-guessed, and in some 
cases even stymied, the prosecutorial decisions of local U.S. Attorneys' of-
fices and line attorneys."51 The subcommittee's essential concern was that 
political pressures to go easy on polluters were being applied to officials in 
Main Justice, who in turn were undermining the enforcement efforts of line 
attorneys and the U.S. Attorneys' Offices. Dingell's position was that the 
U.S. Attorneys' Offices should be allowed to make their own decisions, 
without approval from Main Justice, as to whether to proceed with criminal 
prosecutions, and that in handling cases they should be able to use their 
own lawyers and those from EPA rather than bringing in lawyers from the 
Environmental Crimes Section of the Environment Division.52 
49. See REPORT ON THE PRESIDENT'S CLAIM OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE, supra note 42. 
See generally Peter M. Shane, Legal Disagreement and Negotiation in a Government of 
Laws: The Case of Executive Privilege Claims Against Congress, 71 MINN. L. REV. 461, 
466-83 (1987) (discussing roles of EPA, DOJ, and Congress in this dispute). 
50. The Attorney General's Role as Chief Litigator for the United States, 6 OP. OFF. 
LEGAL COUNS. 4 7, 62 ( 1982 ). . 
51. Reid P.F. Stuntz, Remarks, in ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY, CRIMINAL 
ENFORCEMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 9 (Oct. 7, 1993). 
52. The subcommittee's concerns over effective enforcement and skepticism about 
centralized control are set out at length in a June 27, 1994 letter from Congressmen John 
Dingell and Dan Schaefer (then the ranking Republican) to Attorney General Reno. Draw-
ing from testimony given by former prosecutors at committee hearings, the letter com-
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There followed almost three years of hearings, investigatory interviews, 
exchanges of letters, reports, subpoenas, threats, and bluster.53 Since the 
driving force here was an investigation by an oversight committee, the 
struggle not surprisingly did not lead to proposed or enacted legislation. 
Nor is there any consensus as to whether the problems were real or only 
perceived. 54 
In the end, DOJ did revise the U.S. Attorneys' Manual to decentralize 
prosecutorial decisionmaking in environmental cases more along the lines 
of the subcommittee's preferences. 55 But at least as important in bringing 
the controversy to a close was the outcome of the 1994 elections, which put 
plained that: 
(I) The requirement, imposed by a 1993 amendment to the U.S. Attorneys' Man-
ual, that the Assistant Attorney General in Washington approve environmental crimi-
nal prosecutions had led to inappropriate interference and usurpation of local prose-
cutorial authority, pursued a misguided goal of national consistency, and produced 
the appearance, if not the reality, of ad hoc, politically motivated decisions. 
(2) At most, there should be a limited number of clearly defined situations in which 
consultation between the U.S. Attorneys' Offices and the Main Justice is required; 
Main Justice's role should not go beyond that. 
(3) The Assistant Attorney General should not be meeting with defense counsel. 
(4) The U.S. Attorneys' Offices should not be forced to involve lawyers from the 
Environmental Crimes Section (ECS) and should instead be able to rely on EPA at-
torneys and local and state prosecutors. Lawyers from Main Justice are less avail-
able, less familiar with individual cases, and less knowledgeable about the environ-
mental laws and the EPA's regulations. Moreover, involving ECS lawyers "invites 
Headquarters interference and results in a ceding of control over the direction of the 
litigation to managerial personnel at the ECS and ENRD, whose involvement often 
has been viewed as counterproductive." 
Letter from Reps. John D. Dingell & Dan Schaefer, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investi-
gations of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, to Janet Reno, Attorney Gen-
eral, Department of Justice (June 27, 1994). 
53. See Theodora Galacatos, Note, The United States Department of Justice Environ-
mental Crimes Section: A Case Study of Inter- and lntrabranch Conflict Over Congres-
sional Oversight and the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 587, 
612-28 (1995) (describing course of investigation and controversy). 
54. See Richard J. Lazarus, Meeting the Demands of Integration in the Evolution of 
Environmental Law: Reforming Environmental Criminal Law, 83 GEO. L.J. 2407, 2496-507 
( 1995) (reviewing circumstances of six cases that gave rise to investigation and concluding 
that in fact decisions not to prosecute were, if ad hoc and intuitive, nonetheless reasonable). 
55. See Memorandum from Janet Reno, Attorney General, to Holders of the United 
States Attorneys' Manual, Title 5, at 2-8 (Aug. 23, 1994) (replacing section 5-11.000 of the 
U.S. ATIORNEYS' MANUAL and, among other things, abolishing previously required "case 
initiation report" that the U.S. Attorney's Office had had to file with the Environment and 
Natural Resources Division); see also Galacatos, supra note 53, at 625-26 (describing revi-
sions to manual). 
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republicans in control of the House generally and the Subcommittee on 
Oversight and Operations in particular.56 
This controversy is somewhat different from those described above in 
that it was not fundamentally about the respective roles of DOJ and EPA. 
However, that was part of the issue; Representative Dingell complained 
that EPA's regional criminal counsels were being displaced by attorneys 
from Main Justice. hi addition, the overall themes are very much the same. 
The essential concern was that by allowing Main Justice to control litiga-
tion, deciding both whether and how cases are litigated, the enforcement 
effort will suffer as a result of: (a) a lack of commitment to a substantive 
program, (b) a lack of expertise, and (c) a susceptibility to political pres-
sures. 
II. RELIANCE ON DOJ AND THE IMPACT ON AGENCY ENFORCEMENT 
Let us start with a strong hypothesis: DOJ representation actually does 
harm to the agency's program. DOJ attorneys will decline to pursue win-
nable cases, will make litigating errors, and will disrupt agency decision-
making in ways that will predictably weaken and dilute agency initiatives. 
Consider DOJ's now relatively calm, but historically often stormy, rela-
tionship with the EPA. Except for the Carter and Clinton Administrations, 
the EPA has for its entire history been implementing essentially Demo-
cratic statutes for a Republican president. All of our intuitions about 
DOJ/EPA relations are shaped by this fact. From the point of view of the 
environmental community and many in the EPA itself, the threat has come 
from DOJ and the White House; help has come from Congress. From the 
point of view of the regulated community, the roles were reversed. In this 
setting, the stronger pro-environment position is to shift authority to the 
EPA; DOJ has a broader agenda that can only dilute or conflict with envi-
ronmental protection goals. As described in Part I, proposals to limit DOJ 
control of EPA litigation have been advanced by Democrats in Congress in 
response to the supposedly lax enforcement efforts of Republican admini-
strations. 
In theory, one could imagine the roles reversed: a lax President and an 
uninterested Congress, coupled with an agency captured by regulatory in-
terests and/or taking its cues from the President and Congress. Here, reli-
ance on a DOJ committed to legality might produce greater enforcement 
than leaving the agency to its own devices. At least one statutory provision 
actually rests on such a premise: namely, the requirement that DOJ approve 
all Superfund cost-recovery settlements of over $500,000.57 The unusual 
56. See Galacatos, supra note 53, at 627-28. 
57. 42 u.s.c. § 9622(h)(l) (1994). 
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provision can only be understood in the context of Reagan-era EPA-DOl-
Congress relations. Congress no longer trusted the EPA after its gross 
mismanagement of Superfund under Reagan appointees Rita Lavelle and 
Anne Burford. In particular, Congress was outraged by the "sweetheart 
deals" that the EPA negotiated with potentially responsible parties.58 With 
the non- and mis-feasance of Burford/Lavelle fresh in mind, Congress 
amended the Superfund to include a lengthy and detailed section on settle-
ments, a subject that the original statute had not mentioned.59 To check the 
EPA abuses of authority and to help "ensure that settlements of significant 
claims by diverse agencies and regional offices will be consistent nation-
ally," the Superfund amendments require Attorney General approval of 
proposed EPA settlements.60 In other words, Congress bought into DOJ's 
usual arguments for centralization precisely because of the same concerns 
about the integrity of the agency's program that in other instances had 
moved it to consider eliminating DOJ control. 
This provision, like the array of political forces that produced it, is very 
much the exception. In the real world, DOJ will only support or under-
mine, but never expand, the agency's programmatic undertakings. Indeed, 
even if DOJ was more committed to environmental protection than was the 
EPA, there is little it could do to force the EPA in that direction . DOJ does 
not formally initiate any legal action other than criminal prosecutions; it, 
therefore, would be dependent on EPA referrals (which would dry up) and 
be put in the position of defending EPA regulations that it had no hand in 
drafting. 
There is thus every reason to be concerned about the substantive conse-
quences for particular agencies' programs that flow from granting DOJ liti-
gation authority. By definition, DOJ will never be as committed to the 
agency's program as will the agency itself. However enthusiastic DOJ is 
about the agenda of a particular agency, it will never have the single-
minded focus on that agenda that the agency itself has. As one former head 
of the then-Lands Division put it: 
There is a built-in tension between the Justice Department and the agencies it repre-
sents. The primary role of the Justice Department is to advance the policies that are 
adopted by the governmental agencies. But the second role of the department is to 
protect the Constitution, the judicial system, and the rule of law. It is in that role that 
I sometimes found myself at odds with the governmental agencies that we repre-
58. See 132 CONG. R.Ec. 28,430 ( 1986) (statement of Sen. Mitchell). 
59. See generally Beth I. Z. Boland, Comment, Consent Decrees Under the Superfund 
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986: Controlling Discretion With Procedure, 
1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 451, 451 (discussing Superfund Amendments that sought to curb 
EPA abuse with specific focus on the settlement process). 
60. 131 CONG. REC. 34,649 ( 1985); see also H.R. REP. No. 99-253, at 30 ( 1985). 
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sented as clients, including EPA. People urged us to take positions that were incon-
sistent with, for example, the property rights provisions of the fourth and fifth 
amendments to the Constitution. They attempted to skew justice in favor of good 
programs that simply were not constitutionally or judicially appropriate.61 
As a result, placing the decision whether to litigate with DOJ, and then 
granting DOJ control over any litigation that occurs, necessarily threatens 
to undennine the agency's efforts. Not only is this true of enforcement liti-
gation (where DOJ screens agency requests), it might also be true of ac-
tions in which the agency is the defendant or respondent in a challenge to a 
particular regulation or other undertaking (where DOJ might refuse to de-
fend agency decisionmaking or do so poorly). 
In this Part we attempt to evaluate how serious and systemic a problem 
this theoretical concern actually is in the real world. 
A. Adequacy of Representation 
It is a longstanding and predictable complaint of agency lawyers that 
DOJ simply lacks sufficient knowledge of the particulars of agency pro-
grams and the underlying statutes to defend them adequately in court.62 
This doubt about DOJ is always brewing and sometimes boils over in em-
barrassing ways: Barbara Babcock mentions "an appellate argument in 
which an agency lawyer stood up from the audience in the midst of the 
61. In the Hotseat at Justice, ENVTL. F. 40, 42 (Jan./Feb. 1994) (statement of Roger 
Marzulla). 
62. The following statement of FDA General Counsel Richard Cooper is typical: 
[A]n agency lawyer who has worked on a regulation since its inception or has worked 
on a program for a number of years simply knows more about it and knows more 
about the needs that gave rise to it, the policies that it reflects, and the practical prob-
lems that arise in its implementation, than does his counterpart in the Department of 
Justice. Because successful advocacy in a regulatory case depends very much on pre-
senting to the court the practical reasons for the regulation or decision, and a thor-
ough understanding of the real world context that it addresses, the lawyers for the 
agency, I would argue, have a significant advantage over the lawyers from the De-
partment of Justice. 
Proceedings of the Fortieth Annual Judicial Conference of the District of Columbia Circuit, 
85 F.R.D. 155, 172 (1979) (statement of Richard Cooper, General Counsel, Food & Drug 
Administration). The 1977 EPNDOJ MOU also nods to this concern, with phrasing that 
rings of careful negotiation of language that began with the EPA, noting that "most chal-
lenges to and enforcement of regulatory standards and procedures adopted by the Environ-
mental Protection Agency involve scientific, technical, and policy issues and determinations 
developed in lengthy rulemaking proceedings in which the Agency's attorneys have been 
involved and can provide the necessary expertise." Memorandum of Understanding Be-
tween Department of Justice and Environmental Protection Agency, 42 Fed. Reg. 48,942, 
48,942-43 ( 1977). 
HeinOnline -- 52 Admin. L. Rev. 1362 2000
1362 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW (52:4 
Civil Division lawyer's exchange with the court and offered a different ver-
sion of the point. "63 
If the attorneys from DOJ lack the technical familiarity with the 
agency's legal issues, the result may be poor lawyering and more losses. 
But are the agencies losing cases they should not be? In fact, probably not. 
After all, DOJ attorneys are pretty good and the government wins most of 
its cases.64 And while DOJ may not seek the help of agency attorneys as 
often as it should, it can and does seek such assistance. Indications of a 
problem are only anecdotal. When an agency loses, it is very difficult to 
know whether to attribute the loss to poor lawyering; harder still to know 
whether lawyers could have avoided what turned out to have been mistakes 
in hindsight; and, in most cases, impossible to evaluate whether agency 
lawyers would have been more likely than DOJ lawyers to avoid the mis-
takes. . 
Our own concededly impressionistic sense is that agency losses, when 
they occur, are rarely the consequence of a lawyer's error of a sort that a 
DOJ lawyer would make and an agency lawyer would avoid. In the much-
discussed American Trucking case,65 for example, the D.C. Circuit set aside 
the EPA's new ambient air quality standards on the ground that the CAA, 
as interpreted by the agency, was an unconstitutional delegation of legisla-
tive authority. This was a major loss for the EPA by any definition, but 
hardly one that one would think would have been avoided if agency law-
yers had played a more prominent role. Rather, the case ended up turning 
on general legal issues far removed from the technical niceties of air pollu-
tion control regulation.66 
With regard to the adequacy of DOJ's lawyering, enforcement cases 
should be considered separately from defensive cases. Enforcement cases 
63. Barbra Allen Babcock, Defending the Government: Justice and the Civil Division, 
23 J. MARSHALLL. REv. 181, 186(1990). 
64. One oddity is that were the government to lose more cases, that might indicate that 
DOJ was being more accommodating to its clients rather than less. DOJ's win-loss record 
will improve if it is risk averse and frequently declines to pursue a referral or defend an 
agency action. If it automatically does what the agency wishes, thereby running greater liti-
gation risks, it will lose more cases. 
65. American Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, modified on reh'g, 195 F.3d 4 
(D.C. Cir. 1999), and cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 2193 (2000). 
66. Two other .significant recent EPA losses in the D.C. Circuit are similarly hard to 
attribute to the shortcomings ofDOJ lawyers. See Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 
1015 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (setting aside an EPA guidance document because of agency's failure 
to follow Clean Air Act notice and comment rulemaking requirements); Association of 
Battery Recyclers, Inc. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1047 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (setting aside EPA designa-
tion of certain secondary materials as "wastes" that are subject to disposal restrictions). 
Note that in the second of these cases, attorneys from the EPA and DOJ divided the oral ar-
gument. 
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are less likely to involve highly technical questions that DOJ lawyers are 
not equipped to deal with and more likely to reward litigation experience 
that agency lawyers lack. An on-the-administrative-record review of an 
agency rule, in contrast, is more likely to involve complex legal questions 
requiring familiarity with the agency's programs and the history of the rule, 
and less likely to tum on knowing the tricks of the litigation trade. Indeed, 
there is a continuum here, with criminal prosecutions at one end. As one of 
us has written elsewhere, the argument for DOJ lawyering is at its strongest 
with regard to criminal prosecutions: 
In a petition for review of an agency regulation, the agency lawyer's familiarity with 
the details and history of the statute, regulation, and overall regulatory scheme are an 
important advantage, not much outweighed by less litigating experience. In the 
criminal setting, however, the situation is just the opposite. There are separate litiga-
tion skills, wholly independent of the particular substantive law violated, in criminal 
prosecutions-more so than in any other area of litigation. As many have noted, en-
vironmental attorneys learned this the hard way in the early 1980s. Technical envi-
ronmental expertise is much less important. Indeed, if one really needs the highly 
specialized understanding of the statutes found only in EPA and not in the Environ-
ment Division or the U.S. [Attorney's Office] to prosecute a case effectively, it is a 
case that should not have been brought as a criminal prosecution in the first place .... 
[I]t does not sit well to insist that an effective criminal prosecution requires the ex-
traordinary specialized expertise of an EPA attorney because it is beyond the ken of 
other government lawyers (and so also, presumably, generalist judges and lay ju-
ries).67 
But this argumentfor DOJ representation in criminal prosecutions is far 
more attenuated in the case of civil judicial enforcement actions, and may 
cut the other way in a challenge to agency regulations brought in the court 
of appeals, on the administrative record, on a legally and factually complex 
and technical point. 
B. Legal Grounds Presented 
From the agency's point of view, adequacy of representation is a func-
tion not just of whether the agency wins the case, but on what grounds. 
Many have pointed out that DOJ is more likely than the agency to rely on 
procedural defenses.68 Along the same lines, studies of DOJ representation 
67. Michael Herz, Structures of Environmental Criminal Enforcement, 3 FORDHAM 
ENVTL. L.J. 679, 715 (1996) (emphasis in original). 
68. See DONALD L. HOROWITZ, THE JUROCRACY: GOVERNMENT LAWYERS, AGENCY 
PROGRAMS, AND JUDICIAL DECISIONS 41 (1977) ("Generally, challenges are met by a com-
prehensive motion for dismissal or summary judgment, often emphasizing jurisdictional and 
procedural arguments and deemphasizing the importance or complexity of arguments on the 
merits."); Catherine J. Lanctot, The Duty of Zealous Advocacy and the Ethics of the Federal 
Government Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 951, 983 (1991) 
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of the FTC reveal that DOJ lawyers paid far more attention to whether 
there was sufficient admissible evidence to win a case rather than to the 
substantive grounds of relative economic harm.69 This can be a source of 
frustration for agencies, because it forestalls resolution of important ques-
tions on the merits.70 
Again, it is hard to quantify the actual effect on agency enforcement and 
(noting that "federal government lawyers routinely raise procedural and technical defenses 
on behalf of their agency clients"); Alan B. Morrison, Defending the Government: How 
Vigorous is Too Vigorous?, in VERDICTS ON LAWYERS 242, 242 (Ralph Nader & Mark 
Green eds., 1976) (noting that government lawyers "are instructed, to paraphrase the closing 
command in Casablanca, to 'round up all the usual defenses"'). 
69. See H.R. REP. No. 95-294, at 334 (1977) (complaining that DOJ fondness for ar-
guments such as ripeness and jurisdiction delayed judicial resolution of important substan-
tive issues and creates uncertainty that undermines environmental protection efforts). 
70. This practice can frustrate not only the agency, but judges as well. One DOJ attor-
ney has expressed his dismay at being criticized: 
both at oral arguments and in opinions for raising threshold litigation defenses, such 
as ripeness, finality, exhaustion of remedies, mootness, political question, Article III 
standing, prudential standing, zone-of-interest standing, sovereign immunity, and of-
ficial immunity. Many federal judges seem to assume that the Department of Justice 
automatically raises these arguments without proper reflection on their applicability 
and force in the context of a particular case. 
Douglas Letter, Lawyering and Judging on Behalf of the United States: All I Ask For Is a 
Little Respect, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1295, 1310 (1993) (shifting blame back to the judges 
for creating such complex and shifting legal doctrine in these areas) (footnotes omitted). 
Judge Patricia Wald has been quite critical of government reliance on "technical" defenses: 
The temptation on the agency's part is sometimes to get the court to duck some of the 
issues at stake, usually via heavy deployment of ripeness and waiver doctrines. By 
doing so the agency delays review and potential reversal for another day, knowing 
that petitioners may drop their challenges in the meantime and that the issue may then 
come up for review in the context of an adjudication, where the chances of affir-
mance are higher. Obviously, there are some occasions when an issue is not ade-
quately presented for review, but my sense is that agencies often try to exploit these 
avoidance doctrines even in complex track cases beyond what is necessary .... The 
cost of postponement is that when judicial review of the issue does occur, it may lack 
the overall perspective and familiarity with subject matter that the complex track pro-
cedure provides. 
Overworked agencies tend to raise threshold jurisdiction issues whenever they pass 
the snicker test: last year [i.e. 1995] such issues were litigated in sixty-nine, or 5 I%, 
of the 135 cases in my survey. Since success with a jurisdictional challenge precludes 
review on the merits-making the case, at least temporarily, disappear-it is not sur-
prising that agencies jump to take advantage of structural barriers to review. 
Patricia M. Wald, Judicial Review in Midpassage: The Uneasy Partnership Between Courts 
and Agencies Plays On, 32 TULSA L.J. 221, 240, 248 (1996) (footnotes omitted). She attrib-
utes this tendency to the agencies; the responsibility surely lies more with DOJ. 
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programmatic initiatives here. In a certain number of cases, DOJ's reliance 
on non-merits arguments will result in avoiding a harmful loss; in a certain 
number it will preclude a useful victory. Nevertheless, in some, probably 
small, number of cases, DOJ's proclivity for non-merits arguments will de-
prive the agency of a helpful decision. 
C. Refusal to Bring Cases 
In general, an agency cannot go to court without DOJ agreeing to repre-
sent it.71 By definition, this means a weaker enforcement effort in that 
there will be some times when the agency would have brought an enforce-
ment action or would have defended an action it took, but DOJ refused to 
71. Taking the EPA as an example, the referral process works as follows. Under the 
1977 Memorandum of Understanding, the Attorney General (AG) "shall have control over 
all cases" to which the agency is a party. Memorandum of Understanding Between De-
partment of Justice and Environmental Protection Agency, 42 Fed. Reg. 48,942, 48,943 
(1977). EPA is entitled to designate an attorney to participate in the conduct of the litiga-
tion, although that attorney "shall be subject to the supervision and control of the" AG. 
Agency attorneys cannot make any filings without the AG's approval. !d. Disagreements 
as to the conduct of the case can be bumped upstairs for resolution by the AG after consul-
tation with the Administrator. See id. Requests for litigation are submitted by the General 
Counsel or the Assistant Administrator for Enforcement to the Assistant Attorney General 
for the Environment and Natural Resources Division and must be accompanied by a litiga-
tion report. See id. DOJ must either file a complaint or explain why it has not done so 
within 60 days of the referral. See id. One hundred twenty days after the referral, the EPA 
can request that the complaint be filed within 30 days; if DOJ still has not done so after the 
30-day period, the EPA is free to go ahead on its own under those provisions that authorize 
it to do so. See id. 
DOJ will not proceed without its "client." In the words of the U.S. Attorneys' Manual, 
"[a]s a matter of policy and practice, civil prosecutions are initiated at the request of the" 
EPA Administrator or other relevant agency head. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, U.S. 
ATTORNEYS' MANUAL§ 5-12.111(A) (2000). Indeed, the most plausible reading of the stat-
utes is that DOJ could not proceed in a civil case without the EPA even if it wanted to. 
Should DOJ learn of possible violations warranting investigation, it will forward the infor-
mation to the EPA; an actual civil prosecution will not go forward unless and until the EPA 
refers the case to DOJ. See id. § 5-12.111(8). This is not the case with regard to criminal 
prosecutions, as to which DOJ can and does proceed without an EPA referral. See id. 
If the EPA decides that it wishes to pursue a case civilly, the Regional Counsel's office 
prepares a formal referral package that it submits simultaneously to the Environment and 
Natural Resources Division at DOJ and to the Office of Enforcement at EPA headquarters. 
Over the years, the referral package has become more and more complex and complete. 
Where once it was a memo of a few pages, prepared in anticipation of working up the case, 
it is now a lengthy memo (approximately 20 single-spaced pages) including all relevant in-
formation about the case. Over the years, the EPA has made greater or lesser efforts at cen-
tralized control of referrals. Thus, in the 1970s the referral package would be first sent to 
the Office of Enforcement and Compliance Monitoring in EPA headquarters; in the 1980s, 
the package tended to go straight to DOJ; now it goes through headquarters again. 
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permit it to do so. Assuming that the agency would have prevailed in at 
least some of these cases, then its substantive program has been reduced as 
a result.72 To an extent that varies significantly over time, from agency to 
agency, and from administration to administration, DOJ refusal to pursue 
referrals is a recurrent source of complaint from federal agencies.73 
This problem seems more theoretical than real. First, DOJ does bring or 
defend most of the cases it is asked to. Defense is virtually automatic for 
all of DOJ's client agencies.74 As a result, for example, the EPA lawyers 
perceive the Environmental Defense Section as having the strongest sense 
of the EPA as a client of any of the sections in the Environment Division.75 
On the affirmative litigation side, DOJ support is less automatic. For ex-
ample, comparing DOJ's reports of its case filings with the EPA's reports 
of its case referrals shows an acceptance rate of 92.5% in 1989, 82.7% in 
1990,91.2% in 1991, and 72.7% in 1992.76 This gap is not insignificant. 
Second, while there is no control group (so it is impossible to know what 
would have happened in unlitigated cases), the agency undoubtedly would 
have lost some-perhaps even many--of the cases DOJ refuses to bring, 
and thus is benefited rather than harmed by DOJ's restraint. Not all the de-
clined cases should be brought.77 Moreover, not all the declined cases 
72. The baseline problem recurs here-that there is less enforcement does not mean 
that there is too little enforcement. A priori, it is impossible to say with any confidence that 
the amount of enforcement an agency would pursue on its own is any more optimal than the 
amount it pursues with the assistance ofDOJ. 
73. To pick one example at random, the Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment (HUD) has objected that DOJ decided not to pursue certain housing discrimination 
cases "simply because DOJ does not agree with HUD's ... determination [that a violation 
has occurred] or HUD's substantive policy position." UNITED STATES CoMM'N ON CIVIL 
RIGHTS, THE FAIR HOUSING AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1988: THE ENFORCEMENT REPORT 231 
( 1994 ). The Civil Rights Commission has recommended that "[i]f DOJ disagrees with the 
substantive issues of a HUD charge such that it cannot litigate the charge in good faith, DOJ 
should authorize HUD attorneys to pursue the charge." !d. 
74. See HOROWITZ, supra note 68, at 40 ("[T]he first-instance defense is routinely and 
sympathetically accorded the agencies."). See generally id. at 39-44. 
75. Interview with Gary Jonesi, Chief of the Waste Identification and Enforcement 
Policy Branch of the RCRA Enforcement Division of the Office of Regulatory Enforcement 
of the Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance, U.S. EPA, in Washington, D.C. 
(Nov. 15, 1994) [hereinafter Interview with Jonesi]. 
76. David R. Hodas, Enforcement of Environmental Law in a Triangular Federal Sys-
tem: Can Three Not be a Crowd When Enforcement Authority is Shared by the United 
States, the States, and their Citizens?, 54 Mo. L. REv. 1552, 1613-14 n.348 (1995). Neither 
the EPA nor DOJ reports how many case referrals DOJ declines to pursue. 
77. At the EPA, for example, enforcement success is measured in terms of referrals; 
this creates an incentive to refer cases that may not be worth bringing. Consistently, refer-
rals skyrocket at the end of the Fiscal Year-what has been called the "lump in the snake"-
to pad the statistics. Judson W. Starr, Too Many Cooks . .. , ENVTL. F., Jan.-Feb. 1989, at 9, 
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would be brought if the EPA controlled its own litigation. The fact that the 
EPA is not always as careful or workmanlike in its referrals as it might be 
can be offered as a reason for DOJ supervision and control of litigation; 
stated in the extreme, the EPA has shown that it lacks the self-discipline 
and professionalism to litigate on its own. Yet even if this is true, it is a re-
ality that results at least in part from the current allocation of tasks, not 
from inherent characteristics of DOJ and the EPA. If the EPA represented 
itself, it could not rely on DOJ to say no, insist on fuller referral packages, 
or tighten up a proposed complaint. Instead, the EPA would perform those 
tasks and therefore behave more like DOJ. At the least, it would develop 
its own screening process, in some measure replicating the current regime 
except within the agency.78 
Finally, these forgone enforcement opportunities are a drop in the bucket 
of the overall enforcement effort. For most agencies, the bulk of enforce-
ment work is administrative rather than judicial. DOJ has virtually no role 
in administrative enforcement. Consider the EPA again. When the EPA 
determines that a person is in violation of one of the environmental laws or 
the regulations issued thereunder, it has a number of enforcement alterna-
10 (1989) (noting that when DOJ "is deluged with referrals" in the fourth quarter of the fis-
cal year, "a number of these cases are dogs, and are being referred only to obtain a bean"); 
Interview with Roger Clegg, former head of the Environment Division, U.S. Dep't of Jus-
tice, in Washington, D.C. (Nov. 15, 1994) (Clegg held that position from July 1991 until 
January 1993). It would be highly unlikely that this lump consisted of nothing but excellent 
cases presented in polished referral packages that for some reason the EPA just forgot to 
send over until the end of the year. 
78. Consider, for example, the Department of Labor, an Executive branch agency that 
has unqualified litigating authority under various statutes. See, e.g., Family and Medical 
Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2617(e) (1994); Longshore and Harbor Worker's Compensation 
Act, 33 U.S.C. § 921 a ( 1994 ). In implementing these statutes, the Department makes use of 
a screening process to determine whether it should appeal a lower court defeat. According 
to officials in the Solicitor's office (Marshall Breger, former Solicitor, as well as Seth Zin-
man and Steve Mandell, the lawyers who were in charge of this screening process in 1995), 
this screening process created tensions within the Department of Labor. Interview by Neil 
Devins with Seth Zinman and Steve Mandell, at Department of Labor, Washington, D.C. 
(Mar. 7, 1995); Interview by Neil Devins with Marshall Breger, at the Heritage Foundation, 
Washington, D.C. Specifically, trial court lawyers who wanted to appeal any and all defeats 
were often disappointed by appellate court lawyers who exercised great caution in screening 
appeals. 
Similarly, to some extent such an arrangement already exists within the EPA. One 
former head of the EPA's Enforcement and Compliance Monitoring Office has written that 
the EPA's own internal screening has weeded out poor quality referrals from the regional 
program office enforcement personnel and Regional Counsels. He reports that in the mid-
I 980s, the EPA headquarters returned I 0% to 15% of civil judicial enforcement referrals to 
the regional offices, because they were insufficiently prepared. See Richard H. Mays, The 
Multiheaded Tortuous Enforcement Assembly Line Machine, ENVTL. F., Nov.-Dec. 1988, at 
14, 17(1988). 
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tives. The basic choice is between administrative, civil judicial, and crimi-
nal, though administrative enforcement in tum includes several different 
types of severity and procedural complexity.79 The EPA perceives these 
alternatives as arranged in a pyramid, with administrative enforcement at 
the base, civil judicial in the middle, and criminal at the top.80 Only the 
most dramatic of these-referral to DOJ as either a civil or a criminal ac-
tion-involve DOJ. For FY 1997, the respective numbers were: 
Administrative enforcement actions (total): 3427 
Administrative penalty actions: 13 13 
Civil Referrals to DOJ: 426 
Criminal Referrals to DOJ: 27881 
While possible monetary penalties are comparable in all three regimes,82 
in practice penalties actually imposed are, not surprisingly, smaller in ad-
ministrative cases than in judicial cases, reflecting the fact that the EPA 
turns to these different mechanisms according to the seriousness of the un-
derlying violation.83 The huge majority of enforcement matters are handled 
administratively through actions ranging from a warning letter or a notice 
of violation, with a view to informal discussion and resolution, through an 
order requiring compliance, to agency imposed penalties. The huge major-
ity of administrative enforcement proceedings settle;84 in these cases, there 
79. One other EPA enforcement tool bears mentioning but is really outside the scope of 
the concerns of the present study. The EPA maintains a List of Violating Facilities pursuant 
to provisions in the Clean Water and Clean Air Acts that forbid federal agencies to contract 
with persons convicted of violating either statute until the EPA certifies that the underlying 
condition has been corrected. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7606 (1994); Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1368 (1994); see also Exec. Order No. 11,738, 3 C.F.R. 
799 ( 1971-1975). Listing is mandatory in the case of facilities whose violations result in a 
criminal conviction; it is discretionary in the case of facilities with violations that have led 
to civil or administrative determinations of noncompliance. See generally 40 C.F.R. pt. 15 
( 1993). 
80. See EPA, FY 1997 ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE ACCOMPLISH-
MENTS REPORT 2-2, Fig. 2-1 ( 1998). 
81. See id. at A-I, A-3, A-4, A-5. 
82. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(l) (1994) (providing for both civil 
judicial penalties and administrative penalties of up to $25,000 per day per violation, al-
though the latter cannot exceed a total of $200,000). 
83. Thus, for FY 1994, the 166 civil defendants were assessed almost $65.7 million in 
penalties while the 1596 administrative penalty orders totaled $48 million. See EPA, FY 
1994 ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE ACCOMPLISHMENTS REPORT 4-6 tbl. 4-2, 
4-9 tbl. 4-3. Average criminal fines were somewhat less than average civil fines but were 
handed out on top of prison sentences. In FY 1994, the 250 criminal defendants were as-
sessed $36.8 million in fines and 99 years in prison. See id. at 4-4 fig. 4-2. 
84. See, e.g., Samuel L. Silverman, Federal Enforcement of Environmental Laws, 15 
MASS. L. REv. 95, 97 (1990) (reporting that "(w]ell over ninety percent of Region I's ad-
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is no formal hearing and no possibility of judicial review-and thus, no 
courtroom lawyering. 
The EPA thus has two quite independent enforcement regimes operating 
simultaneously. The administrative enforcement regime is a "compliance 
system," aimed at preventing violations and remedying underlying prob-
lems; the judicial enforcement regime is a "deterrence system," more visi-
ble, legalistic, and forma1.85 DOJ refusal to bring cases affects only the 
deterrence system, and as long as DOJ does accept most referrals, the fact 
that it does not accept all will not significantly undermine the system. 
Viewed in light of the overall enforcement regime, then DOJ acceptance 
rates of seventy-five percent to ninety percent on EPA referrals are no 
doubt frustrating but cannot be seen as a significant, systemic problem for 
the agency. 
D. Skewing Enforcement Decisions 
Of course, one might still ask whether agencies rely too much on ad-
ministrative enforcement, and whether one reason for this is a desire to 
avoid the gauntlet ofDOJ referral. 
Again, we take the EPA as an example. As already discussed, the EPA 
overwhelmingly opts for administrative over judicial enforcement.86 There 
are a number of reasons for this disparity. First, the regions want to avoid 
interference not only by DOJ but also by the EPA headquarters.87 Admin-
istrative enforcement is left largely to the regions, although the familiar 
battles about centralization have been played out between headquarters and 
the regions.88 Second, administrative enforcement is quicker than judicial, 
ministrative penalty cases" settle). 
85. A compliance system depends on a multiplicity of enforcement actions; a deter-
rence system relies more on an incomplete, but highly visible, collection of enforcement 
measures. See Keith Hawkins & John M. Thomas, The Enforcement Process in Regulatory 
Bureaucracies, in ENFORCING REGULATION 3, 13-15 (Keith Hawkins & John M. Thomas 
eds., 1984) (discussing these two approaches to enforcement). EPA's enforcement regime 
has traditionally been perceived, both by the agency and its observers, as essentially deter-
rence-based. See David L. Markell, The Role of Deterrence-Based Enforcement in a "Rein-
vented" State/Federal Relationship: The Divide Between Theory and Reality, 24 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REv. 1, 10-14 (2000). We do not disagree with that overall assessment, but it 
hides the very large difference between the administrative regime and the judicial one. See 
also Hodas, supra note 76, at 1613-14 (asserting that "only judicially assessed penalties 
have a deterrent effect" since "administratively assessed penalties are both too small and too 
private to motivate voluntary compliance"). 
86. See supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text. 
87. See Interview with Jonesi, supra note 75. 
88. See Memorandum from Steven A. Herman, Assistant Administrator for Enforce-
ment, EPA, to Assistant Administrators et al., Redelegation of Authority and Guidance on 
Headquarters Involvement in Regulatory Enforcement Cases (July 11, 1994) (on file with 
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and would be regardless of the increased layers of review and DOJ in-
volvement in the Iatter.89 To be sure, a full-fledged administrative pro-
ceeding, complete with a trial-type hearing before an Administrative Law 
Judge, can take as long as a trial, and longer than settling a judicial case, so 
the speed point is easily overstated. Still, by and large, the administrative 
route is quicker. Third, there is a clear correspondence, understood by the 
EPA and by the members of the regulated community, between the seri-
ousness and flagrance of the violation and the mechanism used to penalize 
and correct it. With any violator it makes sense to start small, with some 
measure of cooperative spirit, and get tougher as necessary. As long as 
everyone understands that administrative enforcement is less "serious" than 
judicial, then it provides for a more nuanced enforcement response and al-
lows resolution of most matters with relatively less acrimony, stigma, fuss 
and expense on both sides. Fourth, more can go wrong in court. 
In addition to these four factors, however, it is also true that an addi-
tional perceived advantage of administrative enforcement is that it can be 
done without DOJ.90 David Buente, head of the Enforcement Section in the 
Environment Division for over six years in the 1980s, recalls: 
[T]here were always a couple of Regions which seemed to try to avoid having to do 
anything they could, where it was a civil judicial enforcement matter. They would try 
to use administrative enforcement no matter what. And even where they had to, if 
they were to do any enforcement, do civil judicial enforcement, there was just a con-
stant tension in it. This was just systematic and it never stopped.91 
Even in the 1970s, in part to limit DOJ authority, the agency emphasized 
authors). 
89. See Interview with Jonesi, supra note 75; Interview with Walter E. Mugdan, Dep-
uty Regional Counsel, Region II, EPA, in New York, N.Y. (Apr. 4, 1995) [hereinafter Inter-
view with Mugdan]. 
90. See Interview with Jonesi, supra note 75; Interview with Mugdan, supra note 89; 
Kevin A. Gaynor, The Growing Environmental Enforcement Effect-Case Selection and 
Management, I ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY: ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION 243, 245 (1988) 
(noting that "[f]actors tilting toward the case being handled administratively are (that] it is 
typically less resource intensive since it can be handled by the regional office with little in-
volvement from EPA headquarters and no involvement by DOJ; and (that] it may be less 
time consuming"); Hodas, supra note 76, at 1613 (stating that "to get to court, EPA must 
refer cases to DOl, which means convincing another agency to pursue the case, a time con-
suming and unpleasant process"); 4 WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: 
HAZARDOUS WASTES AND SUBSTANCES 287 (1992) (explaining that "government .. . re-
quires a variety of bureaucratic concurrences" before going to court and "[f]or many 
staffers, the prospect of clearing these hurdles is reason enough to settle for the administra-
tive remedies"). 
91. Interview by Joel H. Mintz with David Buente, Chief, Environmental Enforcement 
Section, Environment and Natural Resources Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Wash-
ington, D. C. (Mar. 22, 1991) (emphasis added). 
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EPA-controlled administrative enforcement over DOJ-controlled judicial 
enforcement.92 
The reluctance to go to DOJ would be more serious but for the existence 
of the administrative alternatives. For example, in the early 1980s, when 
administrative enforcement alternatives under the Clean Water Act were far 
skimpier than they are now, it was a common complaint that the EPA relied 
too much on voluntary compliance and waited too long before finally initi-
ating a civil enforcement action. To the extent that hesitation resulted from 
a disinclination to get DOJ involved, either because of the time or the has-
sle involved, the enforcement effort was the victim of the institutional ar-
rangements.93 
It is easy to overstate the foregoing, however, in two ways. First, none 
of this is an insurmountable obstacle. It is a disincentive, not a prohibition. 
Second, the real question is not whether DOJ involvement is a disincentive 
to judicial enforcement, but rather, how much more of a disincentive it is as 
compared to whatever would replace it. Were the EPA to handle its own 
litigation, there would still be some sort of internal screening process. It 
might be smoother, faster, and more cooperative, but it would surely repli-
cate at least some of the problems that now characterize the referral proc-
ess. 
III. COUNSELING 
The focus thus far has been on litigation, which is misleading. Much of 
the lawyering tasks of the federal government are not centralized. Consider 
the following lament, written in 1977 by then-Attorney General Griffin 
Bell: 
Shortly after I took office, the President asked me to determine the total number 
of lawyers in the government and their functions .... We discovered 19,479 lawyers 
[of whom only 3,806 are in DOJ] who are performing "lawyer-like" functions-liti-
gating, preparing legal memoranda, giving legal advice, and drafting statutes, rules, 
and regulations. These lawyers are distributed throughout the departments and agen- , 
cies, and practically no agency is too small to have its own "General Counsel." 
92. See Mintz, supra note 28, at 700 (noting that throughout the mid-1970s "the EPA 
preferred to proceed on the basis of administrative, as opposed to judicial, enforcement of 
air and water Act violations"). 
93. See Clifford S. Russell, Monitoring and Enforcement, in PUBLIC POLICIES FOR 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 243, 257-58 (Paul R. Portney ed., 1990) (pointing to criti-
cisms of EPA practice). 
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Although I am the chief legal officer in the executive branch, I have learned that 
I have virtually no control or direction over the lawyers outside the Department of 
Justice, except indirectly in connection with pending litigation.94 
Note the somewhat petulant disappointment, the assumption that by 
rights the AG ought to dominate federal legal activities, and the dismissive 
quotation marks around "General Counsel." Perhaps Bell's dismay re-
flected an understanding that the greatest impact on an agency's substan-
tive program that a lawyer can have is not in court long after the basic pol-
icy decisions have been made, but as part of the process of policy 
formulation. 
For example, rulemaking. Lawyers are in the thick of the rulemaking 
process for three reasons. First, a regulation must be consistent with and 
within the scope of the authority granted by the relevant statute. Second, 
the rulemaking process operates in the shadow of numerous judicial deci-
sions; many rulemakings are taking place on remand from judicial review, 
and all take place within an overall context colored by a large body of judi-
cial decisions.95 Third, final regulations are frequently challenged in 
court.96 Knowing this, the agency must be especially careful to craft a rule 
that will withstand judicial scrutiny. As a result, rulemakings tend to be 
fraught with a multitude of complex legal questions, and lawyers are cen-
tral players.97 This is not to say that lawyers dictate all decisions or even 
that they have an absolute veto power. It is to say that they play a central 
and critical role. 
94. Bell, supra note 36, at 1050. 
95. See generally R. SHEP MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS: THE CASE OF THE 
CLEAN AIR ACT (1983) (describingjudicial oversight of EPA rulemaking). 
96. Former EPA Administrator William Ruckelshaus once stated that 80% of EPA 
regulations are challenged in court. This number, although frequently invoked, is almost 
certainly an overstatement. The genesis of this estimate, the frequency with which it is in-
voked, and doubts as to its validity are fully discussed in Cary Coglianese, Assessing Con-
sensus: The Promise and Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking, 46 DUKE L.J. 1255, 
1296-130 I nn.I80-202 & app. ( 1997). Whatever the number, it is significant. Moreover, it 
would be higher, and the results of such litigation more disappointing to the agency, but for 
careful lawyering at the rulemaking stage. 
97. See MELNICK, supra note 95, at 141-44, 278-80, 314-32 (explaining influential 
roles of agency lawyers in specific rulemakings); Michael Herz, The Attorney Particular: 
Governmental Role of the Agency General Counsel, in GOVERNMENT LAWYERS: THE 
FEDERAL LEGAL BUREACRACY AND PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS 143, 150-56 (Cornell W. Clayton 
ed., 1995) (using the promulgation of regulations under Title V of Clean Air Act Amend-
ments of 1990 as a case study for complex rulemaking); see also ROSEMARY O'LEARY, 
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE EPA 164-65 (1993) (describing how 
in EPA, as in any organization that is involved in frequent litigation, attorneys gain power 
and influence). 
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The lawyers in question are almost never from DOJ. Rather, they are 
from the agency's Office of General Counsel.98 On occasion, DOJ attor-
neys will advise the agency on the implementation of or compliance with a 
specific decision when a court has remanded a rulemaking to the agency 
for further action.99 These occurrences are limited in scope and frequency. 
Similarly, from time to time DOJ will attend a meeting or be informally 
consulted by the agency. In general, however, agency lawyers advise the 
agency in rulemakings. If the rule is challenged in court, DOJ lawyers 
must defend the product of agency lawyers'advice. 
The exception to this overall pattern occurs when someone else in the 
Executive branch-in the White House or another agency-is interested in 
or affected by an agency action, or when the agency itself approaches DOJ 
for advice. By statute, any executive department head "may require the 
opinion of the Attorney General on questions of law arising in the admini-
stration of his department."100 The AG has delegated this opinion-writing 
authority to the office of Legal Counsel (OLC). 101 DOJ has always taken 
the position that these opinions are binding on the agency that requests 
them, and they are accepted as such by the agencies. 102 
The picture changes slightly when there is a dispute between agencies 
rather than just uncertainty within an agency. The President has sought 
submission of such disputes to the Attorney General for resolution. Ex-
ecutive Order 12,146, issued by President Carter in July 1979, "encour-
98. The Office of General Counsel is not involved in enforcement, except in an occa-
sional advisory capacity with regard to background substantive requirements. Rather, en-
forcement is handled primarily by attorneys in the offices of the Regional General Counsels 
and secondarily by attorneys in the Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance at 
EPA headquarters. See 2 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW PRACTICE GUIDE: STATE AND FEDERAL LAW 
12-80 to 12-83 (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 1995). 
99. Telephone Interview with John Nagle, Seton Hall Law School, formerly attorney in 
the Environmental Division and the Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Justice (Feb. 
I997). 
100. 28 u.s.c. § 512 (1994). 
101. See 28 C.F.R. § 0.25(a) (1999) (assigning OLC duties of preparing formal and in-
formal opinions and giving legal advice to governmental agencies). 
102. Whether they are binding as a theoretical matter can be disputed. See ALBERT 
LANGELUTTIG, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES 147 (1927); Michael 
Herz, Imposing Unified Executive Branch Statutory Interpretation, 15 CARDOZO L. REv. 
219, 227-29 (1993). However, in practice they are universally treated as such. See. e.g., 
Clean Air Act Implementation (Part /): Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health and the 
Envt ofthe House Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 254 (1994) (testi-
mony of EPA General Counsel E. Donald Elliott) ("We get to give a final legal ruling and if 
that final legal ruling by me and my office is made, it is going to stand unless and until it is 
appealed to the Department of Justice and somebody over there says I am wrong ... .''). 
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ages" executive agencies to submit legal disputes to the AG. 103 Moreover, 
before one part of the government takes another to court, agency heads who 
serve at the pleasure of the President, such as the EPA, must submit such 
disputes to the AG. 104 Although somewhat ambiguous, the order is under-
stood to establish the AG as the ultimate arbiter of interagency legal dis-
putes.105 
Notwithstanding the occasional binding legal opinion from DOJ, ulti-
mately the agency itself handles legal advice-giving. Even if DOJ had the 
resources to weigh in on every question of law facing every agency, which 
it does not, it lacks the opportunity, because the agency must come to it. 106 
Because the agency itself must initiate the process, either the legal issue 
will be one outside its area of interest and expertise, or it will have per-
ceived some strategic advantage in having DOJ render an opinion. 107 
In short, DOJ "has never succeeded in gaining anything close to a mo-
nopoly over the provision of legal advice within the government."108 The 
general invisibility of DOJ as a counseling institution is enormously im-
portant for the present topic. Were DOJ to control both counseling and 
litigation, all the foregoing objections and concerns would be tremendously 
heightened. But because it does not, DOJ has only so much maneuvering 
room. Put differently, from the point of view of the agency, it can only do 
so much damage. As the agency's litigator, but only it's litigator, DOJ is 
confronted with a fait accompli. 
CONCLUSION 
These considerations prove inconclusive. They certainly do not add up 
to a compelling case for removing litigation authority from DOJ and letting 
103. Exec. Order No. 12,146, 3 C.F.R. 409 (1979). 
104. See id. 
105. See. e.g., Memorandum ofthe Office of Legal Counsel, Administrative Assessment 
of Civil Penalties Against Federal Agencies Under the Clean Air Act (July 16, 1997) 
<www.usdoj .gov/olc/1997opinions.htm> (resolving a dispute between EPA and the De-
partment of Defense by concluding that the Clean Air Act authorizes, and the Constitution 
does not prohibit, EPA to impose civil administrative penalties on other federal agencies). 
106. Even in the case of interagency disputes, the Executive Order does not flatly re-
quire submission of the dispute to the Attorney General, it only states that the agencies must 
go to the AG before going to court-presumably if they are not planning to go to court, they 
need not go to the AG. See Exec, Order 12,146, 3 C.F.R. 409, 411 (1980). 
I 07. See. e.g., Herz, supra note 102, at 227; Nelson Lund, Rational Choice at the Office 
of Legal Counsel, 15 CARDOZO L. REv. 437, 492-95 (1993) (including in strategic motives 
situations where the agency head may request OLC opinion on issue he is opposed to in 
hopes of a negative opinion, shift of blame for inaction away from himself, or to insulate the 
agency from criticism on a legally questionable issue). 
108. Lund, supra note 107, at 488. 
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each agency handle its own lawsuits. They do point toward two things: a 
careful consideration of context and the importance of effective and mutu-
ally considerate working relationships. 
With regard to the first consideration, context, consider five categories 
of lawyering on behalf of agencies: criminal enforcement, civil judicial en-
forcement, administrative enforcement, defense (primarily of regulations, 
but also of adjudicatory decisions), and counseling. The programmatic ef-
fect of having an outside lawyer will vary from one situation to another. 
As described above, the greatest potential for such an effect lies in coun-
seling, where, wisely, agencies have largely been left to their own devices. 
Next comes litigation challenging substantive regulatory decisions, whether 
in the form of individual adjudicatory determinations or the promulgation 
of regulations. In these settings, agency lawyers may possess three things 
that DOJ lawyers lack: expertise in a particular substantive area, intense 
familiarity with the details of a regulatory program, and enthusiasm for the 
agency's actions. In other contexts, however, DOJ lawyers have more 
relevant expertise than agency lawyers. Most notably, in the criminal set-
ting, the litigator's expertise-knowing one's way around the courtroom, 
understanding juries, knowing the rules of evidence, mastering strategy, 
being familiar with individual judges-are at a premium, the environmental 
lawyer's expertise-understanding the exact nature, history, and meaning 
of every subdivision and cross-reference of the sub-sub-subsections of the 
relevant regulations-should be irrelevant. 
With regard to the second consideration, the nature of the working rela-
tionship, the foregoing suggests that harms to an agency's substantive pro-
gram are a legitimate concern but not so striking or profound as to justify a 
fundamental restructuring. The potential for such an effect, however, does 
argue for DOJ taking seriously its role as lawyer for a client, one with 
many of the prerogatives and power of independent decisionmaking that 
private lawyers' clients have. 
A full consideration of the nature of that relationship and of the other 
costs and benefits of the current regime must await another day. Focusing 
just on the issues examined in this article, however, suggests that (a) a fun-
damental restructuring is unwarranted, but that (b) there may be room for 
greater agency lawyer involvement in defending regulations and (c) DOJ 
must operate as the lawyer for a client, not as the client's board of direc-
tors. 
